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INTRODUCTIONW ITH more. states adopting the doctrine of comparative
negligence in place of the traditional common law doc-
trine of contributory negligence, the, applicability of comparative
negligence to cases grounded on the doctrine of strict liability in
tort must be determined. This article will outline the present status
of this question among the fifty states, analyze the rationales em-
bodied in the question, and conclude with a view of the future.
To date, thirty-one states have embraced some form of the doc-.
trine of comparative negligence in preference to the all-or-nothing
rule of contributory negligence.' Of those states, twenty-eight have
accomplished this change by statute,' and three by judicial decision.*
* Mr. Brewster is a partner of Cray, Cary, Ames & Frye,, San Diego, Cali-
fornia. A.B., Princeton, 1954, J.D., Stanford, 1960.
1 Alaska, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia Ha-
wail, Idaho, Kansas, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Ne-
braska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Okla-
homa, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Washington,
Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
'ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 27-1763 to 27-1765 (1955); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
13-21-111 (1975); CONN. *GEN. STAT. 5 38-224 (1973); GA. CODE ANN. §5
94-703, 105-603 (_ ); HAWAII REV. STAT. 1968 S 663-31 (_ ); IDAHO
CODE ANN. §§ 6-801 to 6-806 (1913); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-258a (1974); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. TIT. 14, 5 156 (1965); MASS. GEN. LAWS, Ch. 231, § 85
(1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. 5 604.01 (1969); Miss. CODE ANN., S 11-7-15
(1972); MONT. STAT. § 58-607.1 (1975); NEB. REV. STAT., 5 25-1151 (1943);
NEV. LAws § 41.141 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN., § 507.7a (1969); N.J.
STAT. ANN., §§ 2A:15-5.1 to 2A:15-5.3 (1973); N.Y. CPLR, Art. 14-A §
1411 (1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 9-10-07 (1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN., TIT. 23,
55 11-12 (1973); ORE. REV. STAT. 5 18.470 (1971); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN.
9-20-4 (1972); S.D. COMP. LAWS, 5 20-9-2 (1967); TEX. REV, CV. STAT.
ANN., Art. 2212a, §§ 1, 2 (1973); UTAH CODE ANN., 5§ 78-27-37 to 78-27-43
(1973); VT. STAT. ANN., TIT. 12, § 1036 (1970); WASH. REV. CODE, Ch. 4.22.010
(1974); Wis. STAT. § 895.045 (1931); and Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-72 (1973).
'The following states have judicially adopted comparative negligence: Alaska,
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
Of course, not all the applications are identical; the doctrines vary
from "pure" to some type of modified comparative negligence."
Six states have enacted comparative negligence statutes which do
not expressly limit their application to negligence cases, but rather
appear to apply to tort liability in general,' while at least twenty-
three states specifically provide that comparative negligence is a
defense to a negligence action.' Of those states which have judicially
Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alas. 1975); California, Li ,v. Yellow Cab Co.,
13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, modified 14 Cal. 3d 103a,
- P.2d - (1975); and Florida, Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
' Pure: Alaska, adopted by court decision, Kaatz v. State, 540 P.2d 1037 (Alas.
1975); California, adopted by court decision, Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d
804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975); Florida, adopted by court deci-
sion, Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla, 1973); Miss. CODE ANN. § 11-7-15
(1919); N.Y. CPLR ART. 14-A, § 1411 (1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. 1956,
9-20-4 (1972); WASH. REV. CODE Ch. 4.22.010 (1974).
The "Not as great as" type (sometimes called the 49% system): ARK. STAr.
ANN. § 27-1763 to 27-1765 (1955); CoLo. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-111 (1975);
GA. CODE ANN. §§ 94-703 (1972); HAWAII REV. STAT. 1968 § 663-31 (Supp.
1975); IDAHO CODE ANN. §5 6-801 to 6-806 (1913); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-285a
(1974); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. 1964, TIT. 14, § 156 (1965); MASS. GEN. LAWS, Ch.
231, § 85 (1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 604.01 (1969); Miss. CODE ANN. 1972, 5
11-7-15 (1919); N.D. CENT. CODE S 9-10-07 (1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN. TIT.
23, 55 11-12 (1973); ORE. REV. STAT. 5 18.470 (1971); UTAH CODE ANN.,
55 78-27-37 to 78-27-43 (1973); and Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-72 .(1973).
The "Not greater than" type (sometimes called the 50% system): CONN.
GEN. STAT. § 38-224 (1973); MONT. STAT. § 58607.1 (1975); NEV. LAWS S
41.141 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507.7a (1969); N.J. STAT. ANN., §§
2A:15-5.1 to 2A:15-5.3 (1973); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN., Art. 2212a, 55 1,
2 (1973); VT. STAT. ANN., TIT. 12, S 1036 (1970); and WIS. STAT. § 895.045
(1931).
The "slight v. gross" system: NEB. REV. STAT., § 25-1151 (1943) and S.D.
COMP. LAws, § 20-9-2 (1967).
'ARK. STAT. ANN. 55 27-1763 to 27-1765 (1955); ME. REV. STAT. ANN.,
TIT. 14, 5 156 (1965) (See George v. Guerette, 306 A.2d 138 (Me. 1973)); Miss.
CODE ANN., § 11-7-15 (1972) (See Edwards v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 512
F.2d 276, 290 (5th Cir. 1975)); N.Y. CPLR, ART. 14-A § 1411 (1975); NEV.
LAws 5 41.141 (1973); and R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN., § 9-20-4 (1972).
"COLO. REv. STAT. ANN. § 13-21-111 (1975), (See Powell v. City of Ouray,
32 Col. App. 44, 507 P.2d 1101 (1973)); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 38-224 (1973);
GA. CODE ANN. 55 94-703, 105-603 (1972); HAWAII REV. STAT. § 663-31
(Supp. 1975); IDAHO CODE ANN. §5 6-801 to 6-806 (1913); KAN. STAT. ANN. S
60-258a (1974); MASS. GEN. LAWS, Ch. 231, § 85 (1969); MINN. STAT. ANN. §
604.01 (1969); MONT. STAT. § 58-607.1 (1975); NEB. REV. STAT., § 25-1151
(1943); NEV. LAWS § 41.141 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN., § 507.7a (1969),
(but see Stephan v. Sears, Roebuck and Co., 110 N.H. 248, -, 266 A.2d
855, 857 (1970)); N.J. STAT. ANN. 55 2A:15-5.1 to 2A:15-5.3 (1973), (but see
Feinberg, The Applicability of a Comparative Negligence Defense in Strict Prod-
ucts Liability Suit Based on Section 402A of the Restatement of Torts 2D (Can
Oil and Water Mix?), 42 INS. COUNSEL J. 39, 51 (1975)'wherein the author
predicts that New Jersey is a prime candidate to be the next state to apply its
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adopted comparative negligence, none have addressed the question
whether it applies to a case based on the doctrine of strict liability
in tort or to breach of implied warranty Interestingly, the
Wisconsin Supreme Court has applied the defense even though
that state's statute speaks only in terms of negligence actions; the
court reasoned that strict liability in tort is actually synonymous
with the concept of negligence.! In the remaining states which have
adopted comparative negligence, this writer was unable to find a
reported case which considered the application of comparative
negligence to a strict liability case."
SHOULD THE CONCEPT OF COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE
ALSO BE APPLIED TO STRICT LIABILITY ACTIONS?
The Florida Supreme Court has recognized that "[i]n the field
of tort law, the most equitable result that can ever be reached by a
court is the equation of liability with fault."'" Certainly that must
be the goal of every court seeking to administer a tort system
grounded on standards of fault or culpability."
If comparative negligence principles are applied in negligence
cases, a plaintiff's misuse, contributory negligence, or assumption
of risk falling short of intentional misconduct are all factors which
comparative negligence rule in a strict products liability suit.); N.D. CENT. CODE
S 9-10-07 (1973); OKLA. STAT. ANN., TiT. 23, §§ 11-12 (1973), (see Kirkland
v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974)); OaE. REV. STAT. § 18.470
(1971); S.D. COMP. LAwS., § 20-9-2 (1967); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.,
Art. 2212a, §§ 1, 2 (1973); UTAH CODE ANN. 1953, §§ 78-27-37 to 78-27-43
(1973); VT. STAT. ANN., TIT. 12, § 1036 (1970); WASH. REV. CODE, Ch. 4.22.010
(1974); Wis. STAT. § 895.045 (1931); and Wyo. STAT. ANN. § 1-7.2 (1973).
7 See note 3 supra.
'Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
'The United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has certified the fol-
lowing questions to the Supreme Court of Florida:
(a) Under Florida law, may a manufacturer be held liable under
the theory of strict liability in tort, as distinct from breach of im-
plied merchantability, for injury to user of the product or a by-
stander?
(b) If the answer to 1(a) is in the affirmative, what type of conduct
by the injured party would create a defense of contributory or com-
parative negligence? West v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 504 F.2d 967,
969 (5th Cir. 1974).
"Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1973).
11 Not included or discussed in this article is the body of law imposing liability
without fault for ultrahazardous activity, since the field of aviation tort law has
been held inapplicable to such rules.
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are subsumed into the concept of plaintiff's negligence for purposes
of reducing, but not barring plaintiff's recovery as previously was
the rule.1" The extent to which the culpable conduct of the plaintiff
contributes as a proximate cause of injury or damage becomes the
focus, rather than a strict cataloging of the precise nature of the
plaintiff's culpable conduct. The contribution of the defendant's
negligence is weighed to yield an equitable division of damages in
direct proportion to the amount of negligence of each of the
parties."
In order to evaluate the extent to which negligence of the
plaintiff can or should be compared to liability of the defendant
based on the doctrine of strict liability in tort rather than neglig-
ence, we should examine the concept known as "strict liability in
tort." Strict liability is a product of our common law."' As Dean
Prosser has pointed out, its principal significance lies in its shed-
ding of traditional contract notions wihch earlier had restricted
the operation of the principle and often created traps for would-be
claimants." The doctrine of strict liability in tort retains the fault
basis for liability. It is this fundamental fact which provides the
point of commonality in the interaction of the doctrine of compara-
tive negligence. For a manufacturer to be held liable in California,
for example, the plaintiff must prove a product was "defective"
when it left the hands of the manufacturer (or dealer as the case
may be)." Liability is "strict" only in the sense that the defendant's
negligence need not be proved in order to prove the product to be
defective. And yet the very concept of a "defective" product,
particularly one defective in design, requires some form of fault on
the part of the manufacturer to allow such a defective design to be
used or product to be sold to the public. Wisconsin has, in fact,
deemed such defects to be the result of negligence by labeling the
1"As the California Supreme Court stated in Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d
804, 826, 532 P.2d 1226, -, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 873 (1975), "[A] comprehensive
system of comparative negligence should allow for the apportionment of damages
in all cases involving misconduct which falls short of being intentional."
13 id. at 829, 532 P.2d at 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 875.
14 Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., 59 Cal. 2d 57, 377 P.2d 897,
27 Cal. Rptr. 697 (1963).
5 See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 98 (4th ed. 1971).
1 Cronin v. J.B.E. Olson Corp., 8 Cal. 3d 121, 501 P.2d 1153, 104 Cal. Rptr.
433 (1973).
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fault as negligence per se, and therefore subject to its comparative
negligence statute."
Since it is clear that a defect may be found even though the
defendant exercised the highest standards of skill and care, it seems
apparent that the doctrine was enacted for the policy reasons of
holding manufacturers liable for a fault which can be shown by
proving only the existence of a defective end product rather than
requiring proof of negligent conduct which produced the defect. In
discussing the similar relationship of evidence in design defect
cases, Professor Wade points out that:
Whatever is enough to show a "defective design" under the Cronin
approach would also be sufficient to show negligence on the part
of the manufacturer. Even if the manufacturer is not aware of the
danger created by the bad design, he is negligent in not learning of
it. This is also true if the product is unsafe because it did not
carry a suitable warning or adequate instruction. The proof neces-
sary to establish strict liability will certainly be sufficient to establish
negligence liability as well. Indeed the position of the California
court in Cronin, in limiting the requirement of a 'defective' product,
would be much more sustainable if the strict liability for products
which is applied were confined to the product which has its 'defect'
developed unintentionally in the manufacturing process thus leaving
the design and warning cases to be handled under the negligence
techniques. There are thus innate similarities between the action in
negligence and in strict liability, and changing the terminology does
not alter this."
If comparative negligence is not to be applied in strict liability
cases, potential inequities lurk for both plaintiffs and defendants.
On the one hand, defendants would still have defenses resulting in
a complete bar to recovery by establishing reasonably unforesee-
able misuse, assumption of risk, and a failure to exercise reason-
able care after acquiring actual knowledge of the defect, in addition
to the surviving defense that the defect was not a proximate cause
of the injuries or damages claimed."'
17 Dippel v. Sciano, 37 Wis. 2d 443, 155 N.W.2d 55 (1967).
1 Wade, On the Nature of Strict Tort Liability for Products, 44 Miss. L.R.
825, 836-37 (1973).
"See, e.g., McGoldrich v. Porter Cable Tools, 34 Cal. App. 3d 885, - P.2d
-' 110 Cal. Rptr. 481 (1973); Barth v. B. F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal.
App. 2d 228, - P.2d -, 71 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1968); Martinez v. Nichols Con-
veyor & Engineering Co., Inc., 243 Cal. App. 2d 795, - P.2d -, 52 Cal. Rptr.
842 (1966).
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In Kirkland v. General Motors Corp.2" an intoxicated plaintiff
was denied recovery completely in a strict liability action alleging
injuries resulting from a seat collapse. The Oklahoma Supreme
Court refused to apply its comparative negligence statute which
is expressly limited to negligence cases, holding that plaintiff's
operation of the automobile while intoxicated was abnormal use
or misuse of the automobile, constituting a complete defense to
the plaintiff's action based on the theory of strict liability. Query,
what would have been the result if the plaintiff had been allowed
to apply the concept of comparative negligence in that strict liability
case?
On the other hand, contributory negligence would otherwise
continue to be no defense in a strict liability case, even if it con-
stituted a substantial factor in causing the injuries, as was the
recognized rule before the recent emergence of the doctrine of
comparative negligence. 1 When one considers the arguments ad-
vanced by those who oppose the application of comparative neg-
ligence to strict liability cases, one cannot avoid the feeling that
those arguments are as unenlightened as the justifications that have
been advanced through the years in behalf of the doctrine of
contributory negligence. For example, consider the following:
1) It has been urged that the product defect becomes an in-
tervening cause, insulating the plaintiff's negligence from the re-
sulting damages. Yet this theory is quickly discarded if an innocent
bystander is injured by the concurrent conduct of the negligent
plaintiff and the strictly liable defendant. The result is that both
the plaintiff and the defendant are liable to the bystander. How
then could it be said that the defendant's strict liability is an inter-
vening cause which cuts off the causal relationship of plaintiff's
negligence in the plaintiff's suit against the same defendant? It
would seem that logic and justice would reject such a position in
favor of the application of comparative negligence to such situa-
tions in the same manner as if the defendant's liability were
grounded in negligence rather than in strict liability.
2) It has been urged that strict liability is a social policy in the
20521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974).
2' See Barth v. B. F. Goodrich Tire Co., 265 Cal. App. 2d 228, - P.2d -'
71 Cal. Rptr. 306 (1968); Luque v. McLea, 8 Cal. 3d 136, 501 P.2d 1163, 104
Cal. Rptr. 443 (1972).
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nature of a penal device which seeks to punish a defendant who
markets a defective product. Yet that basis seems unrealistic if it
does not exact faultless conduct from all who come before the
court. If a grossly negligent plaintiff can recover in strict liability
from a defendant whose product proved latently defective, the
social policy seems only partly developed, and arbitrary in its
application.
3) The "unclean hands" argument has been advanced to deny
the comparative negligence defense to a defendant whose defective
product caused injury. Yet if that be just, how then could a court
allow a negligent plaintiff to recover anything from such a de-
fendant for the same reason? Such a result is reminiscent of the
prior doctrine of the "all or nothing" rule of contributory neg-
ligence.
4) It has been claimed that defendants will be discouraged from
marketing defective products if courts refuse to consider the neg-
ligence of the plaintiff in product liability suits. Yet in the present
world of national and international commerce the proof of this
claim is elusive, and its application has the same penal impact as
outlined above with the same arbitrary focus on the defendant.
5) Perhaps one of the strongest arguments advanced in favor
of abolishing the doctrine of contributory negligence in favor of
comparative negligence finds an inverse application in a product
liability suit. It has been recognized by most courts and commen-
tators that the "all or nothing" rule of contributory negligence is
inequitable and unjust. It is suggested by some that the earlier ban
on the defense of contributory negligence was an attempt to
ameliorate such injustice in the law, after the theory of strict
liability in tort became available. In the context of a system of
comparative, negligence, however, this rationale becomes as in-
equitable as the doctrine of contributory negligence. The practical
effect has been that juries have had to apply their own standards
of fairness and equity through the size of their verdicts-a hap-
hazard system at best."2
From the above review of the more commonly advanced argu-
ments against applying comparative negligence in strict liability
22 See generally Prosser, Comparative Negligence, 41 CAL. L. REV. 1, 3-4
(1953); 2 HARPER & JAMES, THE LAW OF TORTS, § 22.3 (1956).
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cases, it seems that the arguments are as unconvincing as the argu-
ments that were presented in defense of the "all or nothing" rule
of contributory negligence.
Should two fault systems for recovery of damages co-exist for
the same type of conduct by the plaintiff, one of which reduces
plaintiff's recovery to the extent of his faulty conduct short of inten-
tional acts, while the other retains the previously criticized system
of "all or nothing"? Would it be an improvement in our judicial
system to impose a greater liability on a defendant who created a
defective product under the highest standards of skill and care
than on a negligent or grossly negligent defendant? The strict
liability case presumably would still require proof that the de-
fendant's defective product be a proximate cause of plaintiff's in-
jury, but no similar inquiry would be permitted as to plaintiff's
negligent or grossly negligent conduct. In a case based on alleged
negligence or gross negligence of the defendant, the proximate
cause issue would require the assessment of liability in direct propor-
tion to the fault of each participant, reducing plaintiff's recovery
to the extent his wrongful conduct contributed proximately to his
damages, even if the defendant were guilty of gross negligence. It
seems difficult to justify, on the basis of either logic or policy, a
system of jurisprudence which permits lesser compensations against
more culpable defendants and which allows greater recovery
against less culpable ones.
In the Li case," the California Supreme Court had before it only
a negligence action involving two motorists involved in an inter-
section collision. The court paid tribute to the Florida Supreme
Court's decision in Hoffman v. Jones,*" in which that court ex-
pressly refused to rule in advance on problems not before it.'
Nevertheless, the California Supreme Court made clear its philos-
ophy on apportionment of liability:
We have undertaken a thorough reexamination of the matter,
giving particular attention to the common law and statutory sources
of the subject doctrine in this state. As we have indicated, this
reexamination leads us to the conclusion that the "all-or-nothing"
21See Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 811, 532 P.2d 1226, 1231, 119
Cal. Rptr. 858, 863 (1975) (quoting Dean Prosser).
24 Supra, note 3.
'See note 10 supra.
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rule of contributory negligence can be and ought to be superseded
by a rule which assesses liability in proportion to fault."
Our decision in this case is to be viewed as a first step in what
we deem to be proper and just direction, not as a compendium
containing the answers to all questions that may be expected to
arise."
It remains to identify the precise form of comparative negligence
which we now adopt for application in this state .... The first of
these, the so-called "pure" form of comparative negligence, appor-
tions liability in direct proportion to fault in all cases .... We have
concluded that the "pure" form of comparative negligence is that
which should be adopted in this state.
A close reading of the Li case compels the conclusion that the
California Supreme Court has ended the "all or nothing" rule in
California, whether in negligence or any other tort theory of
liability.
Learned writers in the field have also concluded that a dual
fault system produces inequity and injustice and is without re-
deeming merit. Professor Victor E. Schwartz published a special
California supplement following the decision in Li v. Yellow Cab
Co." In his supplement he proposes that comparative negligence
should be applicable in strict liability cases:
A major area of concern is the interaction of comparative neg-
ligence with strict liability....
It is the suggestion of the Treatise that the principle of com-
parative negligence should apply in strict liability cases. In effect,
the theory becomes one of comparative fault. If plaintiff's fault was
a cause of his own injury, the jury should be permitted to reduce
his damages proportionately to that fault. This approach eliminates
the fine distinctions between "unreasonable assumption of risk" and
"contributory negligence." It also helps to resolve the problems that
occur when a plaintiff makes a foreseeable misuse of a product.'
As Professor Wade puts it:
That solution should be apparent on reflection. It is to apply a
11 13 Cal. 3d at 810, 532 P.2d at 1230, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
27 id. at 826, 532 P.2d at 1242, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
28 Id. at 827, 532 P.2d at 1242, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 874.
9 13 Cal. 3d 804, 532 P.2d 1226, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858 (1975).
'
0 SCIIWARTZ, COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE, Supp. 9 (1975).
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system of comparative fault of the "pure type" and to apply it to
strict liability as well as to negligence.81
The first tentative draft of the Uniform Comparative Negligence
Law adopts the "pure" form of comparative negligence and applies
it to strict liability in tort as well.'
When one considers the multi-defendant case involving a strict
liability claim against one defendant and a negligence claim against
a co-defendant, it becomes even more apparent that application of
comparative negligence concepts to strict liability cases is desir-
able, if not necessary, to prevent inequitable results to plaintiffs as
well as to defendants. Consider a hypothetical case of an intoxicated
pilot who fails to observe the gear indicator which shows his
landing gear did not all lock down because of a defect in the
landing gear mechanism, and consequently does not pump the gear
"' Wade, 44 Miss. L.R., supra note 18 at 850.
2 UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT
SECTION 1. In a tort action for damages on the basis of negligence, reck-
lessness or strict liability, including statutory actions unless otherwise expressed
or construed, contributory fault of the plaintiff, or, in a derivative action the
person injured or killed, whether previously constituting a defense or not, does
not necessarily bar recovery, but the damages are diminished in proportion to the
amount of fault attributable to the plaintiff, the injured person or the decedent.
SECTION 2. In a tort action involving contributory fault, the court shall
instruct the jury to give answers to special interrogatories (render special verdicts],
or make findings itself it [sic.] there is no jury, which indicate:
(1) The amount of damages which would have been recoverable
if there had been no contributory fault,
(2) The percentage of the contributory fault for each plaintiff as
compared with the total fault of all of the parties to the action, and
(3) The percentage of the fault of each defendant as compared
with the total fault of all of the parties to the action.
SECTION 3. This act does not change common law principles of joint and
several liability of joint tortfeasors. Contribution rights among multiple defend-
ants are determined in accordance with the percentage of fault of each defendant,
as found by the trier of fact. The court enters judgments on the basis of these
principles and the findings made under Section 2.
SECTION 4. To the extent that liability insurance is available to pay a
judgment entered under this act the principle of set-off is not applied.
SECTION 5. This act applies to all injuries incurred after the act takes effect.
Amend Section 2 of the Uniform Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act to
read as follows:
'SECTION 2. [Pro Rata Shares.] In determining the pro rata shares of tort-
feasors in the entire liability (a) [their relative degrees of fault shall be the basis
for allocations]; (b) if equity requires the collective liability of some as a group
shall constitute a single share; and (c) principles of equity applicable to con-
tribution generally shall apply.' "
UNIFORM COMPARATIVE FAULT ACT, First Tentative Draft (August,
1975).
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down manually and also lands on an incorrect crosswind runway.
In the resulting gear collapse, crash, and ground loop, he is in-
jured. In his strict liability suit against the manufacturer, should
he run the risk of an "all-or-nothing" result because of the possible
defenses of abnormal use or misuse of the aircraft?' If he sues in
negligence against the fixed base operator who just inspected the
aircraft but failed to detect the reasonably observable gear mechan-
ism defect, plaintiff's negligence and assumption of risk at most
would cause a reduction, but not a bar to his claim for damages-
provided he carries the same burden of proof that exists either in
action on causation of the defect or on defendant's negligence as a
cause of plaintiff's injuries. If he sues the fixed base operator-
inspector for negligent inspection, why should he run the risk of
obtaining a higher or lower judgment against him than against
the manufacturer in the same case for the same injuries? In both
causes of action the issues are joined on the question of the extent
to which culpable conduct of the parties proximately contributed
as the total cause of plaintiff's injuries. Application of comparative
fault to strict liability actions would curtail the confusing and arti-
ficial distinctions between contributory negligence, assumption of
risk, abnormal use or misuse, and failure to use reasonable care
after knowledge of a defect is acquired. All these concepts would
be weighed in assessing the proportionate liability percentages, but
they would no longer constitute a complete defense. As Professor
Schwartz suggests:
... comparative negligence will enhance and facilitate the develop-
ment of strict liability theory, rather than cause additional
problems. "
CONCLUSION
The concern expressed in some quarters that the application of
comparative negligence to strict liability actions requires compari-
son of "apples to oranges" does not seem to survive a careful scru-
tiny of what the court must do in administering justice under a
fault system. The argument seems to equate strict liability with a
3See Kirkland v. General Motors Corp., 521 P.2d 1353 (Okla. 1974).
'4 Schwartz, Strict Liability and Comparative Negligence, 42 TENN. L.R. 171,
181 (1947).
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theory of liability without fault, whereas the concept requires proof
of a form of culpable conduct-production of a defective design
or product. When this fallacy in reasoning is recognized, the com-
parison between negligent conduct and conduct which creates a
defective product is no more strained than comparing different
forms of negligent conduct, such as speeding versus failing to stop
at a stop sign.
Proximate causation is the real emphasis in all comparative
negligence cases, whether they be applications to a strict liability
theory or a theory of negligent conduct of the defendant. It will be
the task of the trier of fact to determine the percentage of contribu-
tion of culpable conduct of the parties to the total injuries sustained
by the plaintiff. The precise nature of the fault or culpability of
that conduct is not germane to the determination.
In the opinion of the writer the application of comparative
negligence to strict liability is mandatory if we are to advance to--
ward the goal of equating liability with fault. As long as our
system is based on fault concepts, we can do no more, and we
should permit no less.
